INVASION OF THE PLAUSIBLE SLOP

Invasion of the Plausible Slop

Generative AI and Open Source Cybersecurity

Dr. Kaylea Champion – kaylea@uw.edu
https://www.kayleachampion.com
https://communitydata.science
University of Washington | Bothell

FOSSY Science of Community—August 2, 2025

Community Data Science Collective

UNIVERSITY of WASHINGTON

My research interests

- I study how open source works and how to make it better

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- Including the risks we face and the ways we can prevail

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- Including the risks we face and the ways we can prevail
- But I'm not alone...


Unique
Knives
JAZZ

The key technologies behind generative AI are open source.

- Infrastructure and orchestration

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- Programming languages

The key technologies behind generative AI are open source.

- Infrastructure and orchestration
- Programming languages
- Training data

PyTorch

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Get Started

Choose Your Path: Install PyTorch Locally or Launch Instantly on Supported Cloud Platforms

Get started →

Marketplace > Programming Languages > GitHub Copilot

GitHub Copilot

GitHub github.com | 44,764,208 installs | ★★★★

Your AI pair programmer

Installation

Launch VS Code Quick Open (Ctrl+P), paste the following command, and pres

```
ext install GitHub.copilot
```

Copy | More Info

Version History Q & A Rating & Review

Copilot - Your AI peer programmer

Copilot is an AI peer programming tool that helps you write code faster and smarter.

Copilot adapts to your unique needs allowing you to select the best model for your project, cus with custom instructions, and utilize agent mode for AI-powered, seamlessly integrated pe ng sessions.

GitHub Copilot Free!

learn Install User Guide API Examples Community More 1.7.1 (stable)

scikit-learn

Machine Learning in Python

Getting Started | Release Highlights for 1.7

- Simple and efficient tools for predictive data analysis
- Accessible to everybody, and reusable in various contexts
- Built on NumPy, SciPy, and matplotlib
- Open source, commercially usable - BSD license

Hugging Face Search models, datasets, users...

Main Tasks Libraries Languages Licenses Other

Tasks

Text Generation | Any-to-Any | Image-Text-to-Text
Image-to-Text | Image-to-Image | Text-to-Image
Text-to-Video | Text-to-Speech | + 42

Parameters

< 1B 6B 12B 32B 128B > 500B

Libraries

PyTorch | TensorFlow | JAX | Transformers

Wikipedia Search

Welcome to Wikipedia,

the free encyclopedia that anyone can edit.

107,250 active editors · 7,029,771 articles in English


GENERATIVE AI IS
BUILT ON OPEN SOURCE
FOR THE BETTER, RIGHT?
FOR THE BETTER, RIGHT?
imgflip.com

Cue the Slop

ars TECHNICA

SECTIONS FORUM SUBSCRIBE SIGN IN

AND MAKE IT SOUND ALARMING

Open source project curl is sick of users submitting "AI slop" vulnerabilities

"One way you can tell is it's always such a nice report," founder tells Ars.

KEVIN PURDY – UPDATED MAY 7, 2025 9:49 AM | 132

Credit: Aurich Lawson | Getty Images

"A threshold has been reached. We are effectively being DDoSed. If we could, we would charge them for this waste of our time," wrote Daniel Stenberg, original

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Don't bring slop to a slop fight

Published 2025-03-25 by Seth Larson
Reading time: 1 minute ♥ • 22

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"Just use AI to detect the AI"

We're already seeing companies offer this arrangement as a service. Just a few days ago Cloudflare announced they would use generative AI to create an infinite "labyrinth" for trapping AI

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Follow me: @sethl
Keep up: stickmail
Email: weekly-reports

MAY 2025

CURL AND LIBCURL

DEATH BY A THOUSAND

RECENT POSTS

Hello Sponsor
July 28, 2025

EU-STF for funding critical Open Source
July 23, 2025

curl 8.15.0
July 16, 2025

Death by a thousand slops
July 14, 2025

I love I do it
July 13, 2025

Sponsor my laptop!
July 12, 2025

A Gist of Horrors



My data

- Hundreds of comments across more than 40 sites, posts, etc.

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  HackerOne, GitHub
- Document list initially developed from observation, supplemented by following links and doing searches

Method: Thematic Analysis

Goal: Read textual data deeply to make sense of different lines of thought and argument.

- How does it work?

Braun, Virginia and Clarke, Victoria. (2008) Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*

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- Describing the themes you see

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From this...

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Don't bring slop to a slop fight

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To this:


CATMA 7.2.2
ai slop thematic analysis
Synchronized
Project
Tags
Annotate
Analyze
ID16 DON'T BRING SLOP TO A SLOP FIGHT
not less. This isn't the signal we want to send to
the venture capitalists who are deciding whether to offer
these companies more investment money. We want that "monthly
active user" (MAU)
graph to be flattening or decreasing.
We got a sneak peek at the real
price of generative AI from OpenAI where a future top-tier model
(as of March 5th, 2025)
is supposedly going to be $20,000 USD per month.
That sounds more like it. The sooner we get to unsubsidized
generative AI
pricing the better we'll all be, including the planet. So let's
hold out for that future
and think
asymmetrically, not symmetrically, on methods to make generative
AI slop not viable until we get there.
3 /6
Collection currently being edited
id16 Don't bring slop to a slop fight Default Annotations
Tagsets
Tagsets
Tags
Properties
Values
AI hatred
AI hype
ai paranoia
ai usage declaratior
AI worship
anger
annoyance
Selected Annotations
Annotation
Tag
Aut...
Collection
Tagset
The sooner we [...]g the plane
true cost of ai is hidden
11...
id16 Don't ...
first pass
We want that "m[...] decreasin
call to decrease use of ai
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- Already quite sophisticated and it's early days.
- If detected: Draws time away from real security issues
- If not detected: Waste, fraud, abuse, malware

How bad does it have to be?



[Dependency. Randall Monroe. https://xkcd.com/2347, CC-SA-NC 2.5]

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    ...what's this social model?

Onion model



[Not to scale]

Long tail model

- 80-20 rule



Long tail model

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- ...might feel more like the 99.5-.5 rule...



Long tail model

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- ...might feel more like the 99.5-.5 rule...
- Core work from a smaller group, unique work from an expanded group





[What] So what even is this plausible slop?

Recollect definition:

- High volume, unwanted
- Cheap to produce
- AI generated (context-sensitive, probabilistic)
- Difficult to validate and assess (but ultimately fabricated)
- Attacks both social and technical structures

Is slop like spam?

Spam:

- High volume, unwanted messages ✓

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Spam:

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- Attacks (some social?) certainly technical structures ⇔

Is slop like a denial of service attack?

A DDOS is:

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Is slop like spearphishing?

Spearphishing is:

- Low volume messages ✗

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Spearphishing is:

- Low volume messages ✗
- Challenging to produce ✗

Is slop like spearphishing?

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- Custom generated ✓

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Slop vs historical examples

	Volume	Production	Toolset	Identification	Structural Cost
Spam	High	Easy	Procedural	Easy	(Social?) & Technical
DDOS	High	Easy	Procedural	Easy	Technical
Spearphishing	Low	Hard	Augmented	Hard	Social & Technical

Why are people doing this?

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  - May mutate to improve their strategy
- And if we can't adjust to the volume, does it matter why?

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- Fraudsters and attackers also get better and smarter – they might look less like AI over time with better prompt engineering

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- Dialectical oppositions in proposed solutions

don't bring slop to a slop fight	⟷	AI to stop AI
blame tool not user	⟷	blame user not tool
need for automation	⟷	need for education
platform withdrawal	⟷	platform improvements
collective strategies	⟷	per-project strategies
alternate paradigms financial bonds trust webs	⟷	improvements to current strategies faster detection raise barriers to submission seek regulation

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- Beyond detection: Improved validation tools

What do you think?

Are you seeing slop in your part of FLOSS? How plausible is it?

What kinds of traits would you look for in a solution?

Questions? Feedback?

kaylea@uw.edu—@kaylea@social.coop

https://kayleachampion.com

https://communitydata.science—@communitydata@social.coop

This work has been unfunded so far. I am actively seeking new funding and collaborators!

[Washington Coast. John Murphy. (kingair42) via flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0]

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